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Abstract. There is great interest in using formal methods to guarantee
the reliability of deep neural networks. However, these techniques may
also be used to implant carefully selected input-output pairs. We present
initial results on a novel technique for using SMT solvers to fine tune the
weights of a ReLU neural network to guarantee outcomes on a finite set of
particular examples. This procedure can be used to ensure performance
on key examples, but it could also be used to insert difficult-to-find in-
correct examples that trigger unexpected performance. We demonstrate
this approach by fine tuning an MNIST network to incorrectly classify a
particular image and discuss the potential for the approach to compro-
mise reliability of freely-shared machine learning models.
Keywords: formal methods · neural networks · satisfiability modulo
theory · constraint satisfaction · performance guarantees
1 Introduction
Advances in the construction and training of deep neural networks have trans-
formed many problems in classification, machine learning, and autonomous sys-
tems. But the large number of internal degrees of freedom that make these net-
works so powerful can also prove to be a source of vulnerability—verifying that
such complex systems always perform in an expected way is a daunting task. As
a result, there is much interest in using automatic formal verification techniques
that employ satisfiability modulo theories (SMT) to generate guarantees about
the behavior of such networks.
SMT is a recently attractive technology because of practical solver advances
and mature implementations. Leveraging a complete decision procedure, solvers
can generate a network input that satisfies a given constraint (sat), or guarantee
that no such input exists (unsat). By treating perturbations to the network as
? This work was supported by JHU/APL Internal Research and Development funds.
?? The views expressed herein are solely those of the authors, and no official support or
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variable, we find that we may also use SMT to search for small modifications to
the network itself that guarantee performance it did not already have.
In this work, we use Z3 [16] to embed a set of guaranteed input-output
examples by taking advantage of the ample degrees of freedom in the biases.
Our main contribution is to show that small bias perturbations can internally
model intentionally-planted correct or incorrect input-output pairs with moder-
ately reduced performance on the off-target examples. Our approach could be
used to fine tune networks to guarantee performance on a critical set of exam-
ples, or to poison them with malicious triggers. Furthermore, the technique is
constructive—we either exhibit specific bias perturbations satisfying prescribed
constraints, or generate a verifiable proof artifact showing that none exist.
Prior work The rise in effective optimization techniques for producing adversar-
ial examples has led to an explosion of interest in how to fool neural networks
with inputs that are slight modifications of correctly classified examples. Much
effort has been devoted to finding such adversarial examples in various neural
networks [9,20]. This has inspired researchers to use SMT to verify or construct
neural networks lacking such adversarial examples [1,3,4].
Like Reluplex and related approaches that use SMT to find adversarial
examples or guarantee their absence [12,17,2,6,11,5], we restrict our attention
to neural networks with piecewise affine activation layers. These include, for ex-
ample, rectifier linear unit (ReLU) and HardTanh, but not sigmoid or softmax
layers. However, instead of searching for perturbations on inputs, we search for
perturbations on the network biases, thereby globally and tractably parameter-
izing all possible neural networks of a certain class.
Although we use MNIST as a running example, our patching approach in-
herits the adverse scaling of SMT with neural network size, likely precluding
adoption to vision tasks in the near term. Our philosophy is therefore not just to
retrain with a modified training set as in [10], but rather to globally and reliably
optimize over the space of all neural networks that satisfy a set of constraints.
This allows application in broader frameworks for design and verification of high
reliability systems with formal guarantees on end-to-end behavior [17, §2].
As part of this paper, we review methods (§2) for translating a neural network
into SMT constraints, and follow with detail on using the encoded network to
generate adversarial inputs (§3), as well as adjusting the network parameters
to implant guaranteed input-output pairs. We demonstrate this approach (§4)
by implanting behavior in a small example network for digit classification. We
conclude (§5) with a discussion of the potential for this method to scale to larger
networks, as well as future work.
2 Neural Network as Constraints
The key insight to our approach is the observation that certain neural networks
are well-suited to analysis via SMT, while still being expressive enough to per-
form calculations of interest, see e.g., [17,2]. We encode the input-output rela-
tions of deterministic neural networks as quantifier free combinations of linear
arithmetic constraints.
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2.1 Piecewise Affine Networks
Consider a network f : Rn → Rm, represented by a function y = f(x; θ),
with parameters θ. The input x and output y are n- and m-dimensional real
vectors, respectively. In a typical architecture, the neural network is designed
as a sequential composition of alternating affine functions and piecewise affine
(e.g., ReLU, HardTanh) activations,
f = βK ◦ αK ◦ · · · ◦ β1 ◦ α1. (1)
Each affine function αk : R
nk → Rmk is parameterized by a dense mk-by-nk
real weight matrix W (k) and an mk-dimensional bias vector b
(k),
[Affine] αk(x;W
(k), b(k)) := W (k)x+ b(k). (2)
Similarly, the activation functions βk : R
mk → Rmk are piecewise affine. We con-
sider componentwise ReLU and HardTanh activations, although any piecewise
affine activation can be likewise treated,
[ReLU] βk(x)i := max(xi, 0), i = 1, . . . ,mk, (3)
[HardTanh] βk(x)i := max(min(xi, 1),−1), i = 1, . . . ,mk. (4)
The input dimension of the network f is n = n1 in the first layer, and the
output dimension is m = mK in the last. The signal dimension can only change
in the affine layers (mk 6= nk in general), and remains the same through the
activations (mk = nk+1). For convenience, we split the network parameters into
weight and bias components θ = (θweight, θbias),
θweight = (W
(1), . . . ,W (K)) ∈ Rm1×n1 × · · · ×RmK×nK ,
θbias = (b
(1), . . . , b(K)) ∈ Rm1 × · · · ×RmK .
SMT encoding We encode the neural network by introducing intermediate
variables x(1), . . . , x(K+1), y(1), . . . , y(K) to hold the results of the compositions
in (1). Specifically, for an input variable x and output variable y, the input-
output relation of the neural network y = f(x; θ) is equivalent to
(x = x(1)) ∧
(
K∧
k=1
x(k+1) = βk(y
(k)) ∧ y(k) = αk(x(k))
)
∧ (y = x(K+1)). (5)
The affine layers are encoded as-is following (2),
[Affine-Encoding] v = αk(u)⇐⇒ v = W (k)u+ b(k), (6)
with variables u, v and parameters W (k), b(k).
To encode the activation functions, note that equality constraints involving
‘min’ and ‘max’ can be written as a logical combination of affine atoms:
η = min(ξ, a)⇐⇒ [(ξ ≥ a)→ (η = a)] ∧ [(ξ < a)→ (η = ξ)], (7)
η = max(ξ, b)⇐⇒ [(ξ < b)→ (η = b)] ∧ [(ξ ≥ b)→ (η = ξ)]. (8)
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Accordingly, the piecewise affine activation functions are logical conjunctions
over individual components,
[ReLU-Encoding] v = βk(u)⇐⇒
mk∧
j=1
(vj = max(uj , 0)), (9)
[HardTanh-Encoding] v = βk(u)⇐⇒
mk∧
j=1
(vj = max(min(uj , 1),−1)). (10)
Put together, equations (6)–(10) can be substituted successively into equation (5),
resulting in an encoding of the neural network (1) into a single formula consisting
of conjunctions, disjunctions, and negations of affine atoms. Thus, any neural
network constraint of the form y = f(x; θ), with variables x and y, and param-
eters θ, corresponds to a conjunction of constraints of the form (5).
2.2 Using Pretrained PyTorch modules
To automate our experiments, we developed a Python package, Lantern (“safer
than a torch”), which converts common neural network modules from the popu-
lar PyTorch library [18] to variables and constraints that can be further manip-
ulated with an SMT solver such as Z3 [16]. We assume that the (trained) network
is represented as a Sequential module, a PyTorch container that holds other
modules and applies them in sequence. We further assume that the modules
within a given Sequential instance are either Linear, ReLU, or Hardtanh.
For each module in a Sequential, Lantern generates Z3 variables that
correspond to the inputs and outputs of that module, and encodes the behavior
of that module as affine constraints (see §2.1). In addition, it creates constraints
that equate the output variables of each module with the input variables of the
next module in the sequence. This process returns the input and output variables
of the entire Sequential, as well as all the constraints that represent the internal
modules.
The default settings of PyTorch result in models parameterized by 32-bit
floats, which can give computationally difficult SMT formulas. When the floats
are losslessly cast to Real-sorted variables, formulas involving the neural network
can be handled using Z3’s linear real arithmetic solver. However, in practice we
found that arbitrary precision calculations often dominated decision run times,
meaning that computations involving even moderately sized networks benefited
from a translation to IEEE floating-point arithmetic. Therefore, our software
also supports quantizing networks into floating-point representations.
The round_model() function truncates the significand of the floating-point
parameters of a trained network to a desired number of bits. This function
provides an adjustable trade-off between the neural network’s performance and
the difficulty of the corresponding SMT problem. A rounded model remains a
valid Sequential object, and can be run just like the original at inference time,
albeit with reduced accuracy. By quantizing the model itself, we preserve a one-
to-one correspondence between the SMT problem and the network, even though
the rounded model is no longer equivalent to the original.
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3 Method for Planting Examples
A common application of the SMT encoding (§2.1) is to find perturbations on an
input that would result in a classifier misclassifying otherwise correct examples.
The existence of techniques to find small perturbations is well documented [11,6].
We will briefly summarize these findings (§3.1) with an eye toward explaining
our novel neural network modification strategy (§3.2).
3.1 Adversarial Input Generation
Consider a trained network f , which correctly classifies an input x0 as y0, so
that specifically y0 = f(x0; θ) for the given input-output pair (x0, y0). We would
like the network to instead output a specified y1 for a perturbed input x0 +∆x,
where y0 6= y1 and the perturbation magnitude ‖∆x‖ is small.
In this setting, finding a minimal adversarial input amounts to solving the
(nonconvex) optimization problem
minimize ‖∆x‖
subject to f(x0 +∆x; θ) = y1
(11)
over the variable ∆x ∈ Rn. This will give a smallest perturbation ∆x on the
input that is enough to get the network to misclassify x0 as y1. We target the `∞
norm ‖ · ‖, because it can be represented with piecewise affine (‘max’) functions,
although many other norms are possible. The parameters of the network θ remain
constant throughout the adversarial input generation process.
Optimal perturbation The objective in (11) can be minimized with bisection
by posing a sequence of queries to the SMT solver. Specifically, define the formula
F (α) = ∃∆x ∈ Rm. (y1 = f(x0 +∆x; θ)) ∧ (‖∆x‖ ≤ α).
If, for a given value of α ∈ [α−, α+] (where F (α+) is sat and F (α−) is
unsat), the formula F (α) is sat, then we know that at the optimum ‖∆x?‖ ≤
α; we should therefore decrease the upper bound to α+ := α, and determine
the satisfiability of F ((α+ + α−)/2), say. Otherwise if F (α) is unsat, then a
valid input perturbation must have norm no less than α; therefore, to make the
network misclassify x0 as y1 we should increase the lower bound to α− := α,
and try again. This way, a minimal value of ‖∆x‖ can be determined within an
error  in O(log2(1/)) bisection steps.
Class membership Encoding the constraint y1 = f(x0 + ∆x; θ) in (11) de-
serves special attention in the case of classifiers, because class membership must
be encoded with set membership (e.g., lying on the correct side of a decision sur-
face). For example, for m = 10 (MNIST digit classification problem), we identify
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the output indices with the classes ‘1’, ‘2’, . . . , ‘9’, ‘0’. For example, the network
output
f(x0; θ) =

0.01
0.95
. . .
0.02

is interpreted as ‘2’, because the second component has maximal value (softmax
layers are disallowed in linear SMT theories). A class equality constraint like
y = ‘7’ is in reality a requirement on the seventh component of y to be maximal,
(y7 > y1) ∧ · · · ∧ (y7 > y6) ∧ (y7 > y8) ∧ · · · ∧ (y7 > y10). (12)
A class membership constraint is thus a conjunction of affine constraints.
Forcing correctness The same adversarial input generation technique can
be used if the correctness senses of y0 and y1 are switched: when the network
incorrectly classifies x0 as y0, then solving the optimization problem (11) is akin
to finding a minimum-size perturbation on the input that will force the output
to the desired correct value y1. In this case, the network outputs a correct value
with a small input perturbation, even if it originally failed to do so.
3.2 Adversarial Network Modification
The idea of forcing output values introduced in the previous section can similarly
be used to patch the network parameters to achieve desired performance on
specified input-output pairs. The key difference lies in patching the biases only,
meanwhile keeping the weights fixed.
Bias patching Consider a supervised task with a training database of input-
output pairs D = {(x, y)} ⊂ Rn×Rm. We would like to keep the neural network
output values the same on a finite set Dkeep ⊂ Rn × Rm, and force a change
on a finite set Dchange ⊂ Rn ×Rm of values. It is not necessary that Dkeep or
Dchange be subsets of D, but we require that Dkeep∩Dchange = ∅. The procedure
for patching the network biases consists of two conceptual steps:
1. [Train] Classically train (e.g., using stochastic gradient descent) a ReLU
network f(x; θ) on the database D, obtaining the parameter vector θ =
(θweight, θbias) as a starting point.
2. [Patch] Keeping the weight component θweight fixed, modify the network
from Step 1 by solving the optimization problem
minimize ‖∆θ‖
subject to y = f(x; θ +∆θ), for all (x, y) ∈ Dkeep, (13)
y′ = f(x′; θ +∆θ), for all (x′, y′) ∈ Dchange, (14)
∆θweight = 0. (15)
over the variables ∆θ = (∆θweight, ∆θbias).
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Classical neural network training will not (typically) result in a parameter
vector θ that correctly assigns all points in D. However, the SMT patching
procedure will force the values in Dkeep and Dchange, or otherwise return a proof
that a network modification of the prescribed type is impossible.
Linear arithmetic The biases can can be patched because they enter affinely
into the neural network constraints (5) (whereas the weights enter multiplica-
tively). As a result, bias perturbation variables can be added at each αk network
layer while still using a decision procedure based on linear arithmetic, cf. (6),
v = αk(u)⇐⇒ v = W (k)u+ b(k) +∆θ(k)bias. (16)
Staying within a linear decision theory helps performance, although we expect
weight modification with nonlinear theories (and multiplicative terms) to be
practical in small networks [7].
A key scaling challenge lies in keeping the fewest number of constraints in (13)
and (14), since there are as many instances of the fully encoded neural network
in the optimization problem as there are examples in Dkeep ∪Dchange. To help
this potential difficulty, it is desirable to keep |Dkeep| and |Dchange| small.
4 Experiments
Following the outlined approach (§3), we encoded small- and medium-sized neu-
ral networks to test the generation of adversarial inputs in realistic cases. Ad-
ditionally, we modified the medium-sized network to give prescribed outputs
for prescribed inputs. We performed experiments using the MNIST database of
handwritten digits [15].
Because the computational complexity of the SMT decision procedure is
heavily dependent on the total number of units in the network under consider-
ation, the 28-by-28 pixel grayscale images of handwritten digits were flattened
to vectors of length 784, and dimensionally reduced with Principal Component
Analysis (PCA) by selecting the top-30 or top-100 components, depending on
the experiment. To improve runtime of the solver, network weights and biases
were rounded using the round_model() function (§2.2).
4.1 Adversarial Input Generation
The “small” MNIST classifier architecture is shown below.
[image]
784→ PCA 30→
[
[x]
30→ Linear 10→ ReLU 10→ Linear 10→ ReLU 10→ [y]
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
y=f(x;θ)
For the first experiment, the top-30 principal component network was probed
to see if there exist adversarial inputs to make the network misclassify specific
images. The image representations with reduced dimensionality are treated as
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inputs to f , a four-layer PyTorch Sequential model composed of alternating
Linear and ReLU modules trained with stochastic gradient descent. The compo-
nents of the output vector are used to decide the digit class according to (12).
This small network achieves 72.0% accuracy on the validation data.
Fig. 1. The network correctly classifies the original MNIST image (left) as ‘1’ by observ-
ing the top-30 PCA components (middle). The input-perturbed image is misclassified
as ‘7’ (right).
We use Lantern to encode the small network as Z3 constraints. Then we find
a reduced-dimensionality representation of an image of a ‘1’ that the network can
correctly classify, and force that image to misclassify as ‘7’. Figure 1 shows the
original image, the image after PCA compression, and finally the misclassified
version with an adversarial perturbation having magnitude ‖∆x‖∞ = 0.4.
4.2 Adversarial Network Modification
In this experiment, our goal was to modify the network biases such that several
‘1’ instances would be misclassified as ‘7’, while the other classes continued to
be accurately classified. To test scalability and network quantization, we used
a slightly larger, top-100 component PCA compressed data set with a similar
neural network architecture:
[image]
784→ PCA 100→
[x]
100→
+∆θbias
↓
Linear
33→ ReLU 33→
+∆θbias
↓
Linear
10→ ReLU 10→ [y]

︸ ︷︷ ︸
y=f(x;θ+∆θ)
Prior to any bias modifications, this medium-sized network had a 93.0% overall
classification accuracy. Table 1 breaks down the accuracy by each digit.
We encoded the linear layers with constraints of the form
y(k) = W (k)x(k) + b(k) +∆θ
(k)
bias (17)
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where W (k) and b(k) are the (fixed) network weights and biases for the layer,
x(k) and y(k) are the (variable) inputs and outputs of each layer, and ∆θ
(k)
bias are
(variable) bias perturbations.
To construct Dkeep and Dchange, we chose one set of digits ‘0’ through ‘9’,
which the original network classified correctly, and added them to Dkeep. This
resulted in |Dkeep| = 10 constraints of type (13). We also found a specific ‘1’
image and set its classification target to ‘7’. This resulted in |Dchange| = 1
constraint of type (14). Additionally, we added constraints ‖∆θbias‖∞ ≤ 0.25 to
bound maximum parameter perturbations.
Guarantees with inherited performance The results of our experiment are
summarized in Table 1, which shows the digit classification performance of the
modified network. The accuracy shown for the modified network (second column)
is an average of two different Dkeep and Dchange sets. These results indicate a
considerable decrease in accuracy when classifying ‘1’s, due to the forced pre-
scription in Dchange, along with moderately smaller accuracy differences in the
other classes. Note that for the modified network, the eleven examples in Dkeep
and Dchange are guaranteed to be at their prescribed, forced values.
Table 1. Classification accuracy of each digit with the original network weights and
biases, modified biases, and modified biases using a quantized model.
Digit Accuracy (%)
Original Modified Quantized
‘1’ 97.6 73.9 68.9
‘2’ 92.4 89.6 91.1
‘3’ 91.1 89.3 78.4
‘4’ 94.0 84.2 86.1
‘5’ 86.8 77.6 91.4
‘6’ 95.1 90.5 93.3
‘7’ 91.6 95.0 93.4
‘8’ 91.1 85.9 74.8
‘9’ 91.8 92.5 89.2
‘0’ 97.9 96.7 98.6
Overall 93.0 87.4 89.2
It takes four hours for Z3 to find a satisfying assignment to ∆θbias in the
top-100 network using linear rational arithmetic.3 After quantizing the network
parameters to 10 bits with round_model(), run times went down to 30 minutes
per floating point arithmetic decision call (8× speedup). Performance of the
quantized model is shown in the last column of Table 1. The per-class accuracy
for the quantized model is an average of three different Dkeep and Dchange sets.
3 Tested on an Intel(R) Core(TM) i9-8950HK CPU @ 2.90GHz on a 64-bit Windows
operating system with 32.0 GB installed RAM.
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A visualization of how much the network biases changed is shown in Figure 2.
Because the size distributions of the original and perturbed biases are so simi-
                   
 % L D V H V
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
  
  
 &
 R X
 Q W
 2 U L J L Q D O
(a) original biases
                   
 % L D V H V
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
  
  
 &
 R X
 Q W
 G % L D V
(b) ∆θbias values
                   
 % L D V H V
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
  
  
 &
 R X
 Q W
 2 U L J L Q D O  G % L D V
(c) fine-tuned biases
Fig. 2. Histograms of (a) original network biases, (b) solutions for the bias perturba-
tions for adversarial network modification, and (c) final modified biases.
lar, Figure 2 suggests that detection of this type of network tampering may be
difficult. Thus, an across-the-board small change in network biases guaranteed
the eleven specific examples to be classified in a user-prescribed way.
5 Conclusion and Future Work
In this work, we have shown how to use SMT to implant behaviors in neural
networks that use piecewise affine activations. In doing so, we also detailed a
method for automatically encoding PyTorch networks into Z3 constraints. We
computed bias perturbations for a relatively small neural network that performs
classification on the MNIST data set. We plan to extend this approach to larger
neural networks, such as deep convolutional networks for image recognition and
deep reinforcement learning networks. In many deep networks, for a particular
input, only a small fractions of neurons end up contributing to the output [8,19].
Thus we can (i) select a subset of neurons to modify in a large network, and
(ii) improve the efficiency of the decision procedure, by abstracting the majority
of the network and locally optimizing the biases of selected neurons.
We plan to test a solver algorithm better optimized to the specific constraint
solution problem, thereby increasing the scale of networks that can be modified
and whose performance can be guaranteed. Because there are a wealth of net-
works of modest size, especially those that perform simple autonomous control,
we see value to this approach despite SMT’s unfavorable computational scaling.
Further research on this technique will aid both in understanding the pitfalls of
downloading and using freely shared pretrained neural networks, as well as the
potential for verifying the provable reliability of neural networks in the loop.
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